TJUE – Fauré Le Page Paris 1717 vs Goyard

The judgment reinforces the legal principle that a trademark may be misleading when, by suggesting a business history that does not exist, it leads consumers to attribute to the goods a quality and prestige that do not correspond to reality.

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter, CJEU) of March 26, 2026 (C‑412/24, Fauré Le Page v. Goyard); resolves the preliminary ruling requested by the French Court of Cassation in the context of the dispute between the companies Fauré Le Page Paris and Fauré Le Page Maroquinier and the company Goyard ST-Honoré, all of which operate in the leather goods and luxury goods sector.

The dispute stems from the registration by Fauré Le Page Paris—a company incorporated in 2009—of several trademarks incorporating the designation “Fauré Le Page Paris 1717” to designate leather goods and travel items. Goyard challenged those trademarks on the grounds that the reference to the year 1717 falsely suggested the existence of a company founded in the 18th century and the transmission of certain heritage, when in reality, the French company Maison Fauré Le Page, which sold weapons and leather accessories, had ceased operations in 1992 and there was no actual business continuity with the current company.

After an initial dismissal, the French Court of Cassation overturned the ruling, and in the decision issued following the referral, the Paris Court of Appeal declared the trademarks invalid due to a serious risk of misleading consumers. It found that the reference “Paris 1717” evoked the date and place of the original company’s founding and could lead the public to believe in historical continuity and extensive experience in the luxury leather goods sector, which constitutes a decisive factor in the purchasing decision.

In light of the foregoing, Fauré Le Page filed an appeal, arguing that a trademark can only be considered misleading if it misleads consumers regarding the characteristics of the goods or services, and not those of its owner, and that the disputed trademarks did not describe any specific characteristics of the goods. It therefore argued that the contested trademarks did not describe any specific characteristic of the leather goods designated by those trademarks, but merely conveyed, at most, a general idea of quality, and thus could not be considered misleading within the meaning of Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 2008/95.

However, the Court of Cassation held that the misleading nature of a trademark may also stem from characteristics specific to the company, such as its long-standing reputation, where the consumer infers a quality or prestige of the product from the false information. It further noted that, in the case of luxury goods, quality is not assessed solely on the basis of their material characteristics, but also on the basis of their appearance and the prestige of their image (see judgment of April 23, 2009, Copad, C-59/08, EU:C:2009:260, paragraphs 24–26).

In this context, the Court of Cassation decided to stay the proceedings and referred several questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, seeking to determine whether a trademark may be considered misleading, for the purposes of Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 2008/95, when it includes a fictitious number or date that the relevant public perceives as an ancient year of foundation and which, precisely for that reason, evokes a non-existent tradition and expertise, thereby influencing the consumer’s perception of the quality and prestige of the goods.

First, the CJEU notes that the ground for refusal or invalidity on the basis of misleading character requires that the risk of misleading the public arise intrinsically from the sign itself, regardless of its subsequent use, and that the existence of actual deception or a sufficiently serious risk of deception must be assessed in light of the circumstances of the case. It also emphasizes that, in principle, the misleading nature must relate to a characteristic of the goods or services, and not merely to a characteristic of the trademark owner.

In the luxury leather goods sector, the CJEU emphasizes that consumers attach particular importance to the history and longevity of the company marketing the products, such that a trademark with a history can have a decisive influence on the purchase decision by leading consumers to infer special quality and prestige. In this context, the inclusion in a trademark of a number that the public perceives as the year the company was founded can act as a guarantee of quality and helps to confer an image of prestige on the product; therefore, when such prestige does not actually exist, there may be effective deception or a sufficiently serious risk of deception, to the extent that the consumer is misled as to an essential characteristic of the product, quality being understood in the broad sense.

The CJEU thus rejects a restrictive interpretation of Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 2008/95 that would limit deception to the physical or technical properties of the product. On the contrary, it acknowledges that, in certain sectors—such as luxury goods—the intangible elements associated with the brand’s history and tradition form an integral part of the product’s value and may decisively influence the purchase decision.

However, the CJEU clarifies that not every historical reference will automatically be misleading. It is for the national court to assess, in light of all the circumstances of the case, whether the number incorporated into the trademark is actually perceived by consumers as a year of foundation, whether it evokes tradition and prestige, and whether such evocation is likely to mislead the consumer. In this analysis, the trademark must be examined as a whole, taking into account elements such as the combined presence of the number “1717” and the term “Paris,” as well as the overall message conveyed by the sign.

The judgment thus offers a nuanced yet clear answer: a trademark may be misleading when it constructs a fictional historical narrative that attributes to the products a quality and prestige that do not correspond to reality. In doing so, the CJEU strengthens consumer protection against “heritage branding” strategies lacking a factual basis and adapts the interpretation of trademark law to the economic logic of the luxury sector.

In short, the ruling consolidates a broad and functional understanding of the concept of “quality” as a product characteristic, incorporating into it the symbolic and intangible elements that, in certain markets, are decisive for consumer perception.